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Abstract
We present a model of endogenous …rm growth with R&D investment and stochastic
innovation as the engines of growth. The model for …rm growth is a partial equilibrium model
drawing on the quality ladder models in the macro growth literature, but also on the literature
on patent races and the discrete choice models of product di¤erentiation. We examine to
what extent the assumptions and the empirical content of our model are consistent with
many of the the …ndings that have emerged from empirical studies of growth, productivity,
R&D and patenting at the …rm level. The analysis shows that the model …ts well with a
number of empirical patterns such as (i) a skewed size distribution of …rms with persistent
di¤erences in …rm sizes, (ii) …rm growth independent of …rm size, as stated in the so-called
Gibrat’s law, and (iii) R&D investment proportional to sales.
¤Previous versions of this paper have been presented at workshops at Statistics Norway, Institute for Fiscal
Studies (London), the “Economics and econometrics of innovation” conference in Strasbourg (June, 1996), the
NBER Summer Institute 1996 and the “Innovation, competition and employment” conference at Crete (August,
1997). We have received a number of useful comments at those presentations and from Philippe Aghion, Petter
Frenger, Per B. Maurseth, Tore Nilssen, Trond E. Olsen, Atle Seierstad and, in particular, Jarle Møen. The paper
has also bene…ted from many suggestions from an anonymous referee. The research of Klette and Griliches was
supported by the Norwegian Research Council (Nærings-LOS) and the Mellon Foundation, respectively.
11 Few theories on …rm growth and …rm heterogeneity
Empirical research on …rm and plant level data has revealed a large amount of heterogeneity
within narrowly de…ned industries. This heterogeneity is striking in a number of dimensions
such as size (sales, employment), …rm growth rates, rates of job creation and job destruction,
and also in variables such as capital intensity and R&D intensity1. Much of the heterogeneity,
e.g. in terms of sales and R&D investments, is quite persistent over a number of years. Recently,
researchers have addressed the question of how we can reconcile this persistent heterogeneity
with theories based on optimizing agents (see the survey by Sutton, 1997).
This paper presents a theoretical model with heterogeneous …rms within an industry, where
R&D investments and stochastic innovation are the engines of …rm growth. The model presented
is, for speci…c parameter values, consistent with at least three widely studied empirical regu-
larities of R&D investments, …rm sales and …rm growth: (i) R&D intensities are independent
of sales2. This result is derived from our model which treats R&D investments as a non-rival
input in production. (ii) Firm growth is, to a …rst approximation, independent of size. This
relationship is often referred to as Gibrat’s law3. (iii) The size distribution of …rms is highly
skewed with persistent di¤erences in …rm sizes. This is true both for sales and other variables
such as R&D investments. This third regularity is closely related to the second regularity, as has
been emphasized by Simon and his co-workers (see Ijiri and Simon, 1977). Our contribution is
to show that these three regularities can all be related and derived from a fully speci…ed model
of endogenous …rm growth, based on optimizing agents. We examine whether the empirical
content of the assumptions required to derive the model make sense in view of what has been
learned from microeconometric research on innovation, patents and R&D, and we also consider
a number of additional empirical implications that we derive from the model.
Our objective is to develop a framework for empirical studies incorporating the observed
heterogeneity across …rms in R&D investments and various measures of performance, e.g. pro-
ductivity, patenting, pro…tability and sales growth. Currently, econometric studies of R&D
investments and …rm performance are typically based on econometric models without much the-
oretical content, while theorists build their models of R&D and innovation focusing on macro
issues and a few stylized facts. Our model integrates the stochastic process for R&D investments
into the model of …rm performance, and the model allows us to consider how the behavior of a
1See Geroski (1998) for a survey of the large, empirical literature on …rm heterogeneity, emphasizing that “the
heterogeneities in performance between …rms persist into the long run more or less regardless of how performance
is measured.”
2See Cohen and Klepper (1996) for a recent review of this issue.
3See Sutton (1997) for a comprehensive survey.
2…rm evolves over time, and also how …rm behavior interact with the decisions and performance
of its competitors. Through such a broad view, we hope that this framework will help us to
obtain some deeper insights into the rich set of information contained in many panel data sets on
…rm performance in R&D intensive industries which, over the last decade, have become widely
available.
Much of the recent work in macro growth theory is inspired by the observation that poor
countries do not catch up with the richer countries. This is somewhat parallel to the micro
observation that …rm growth is largely independent of …rm size, and the speci…cation of the
model we present below is inspired by the macro-models of endogenous growth, in particular the
version of the quality ladder model developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch.7). Previous
versions of the quality ladder model by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991a,b) imply that each new innovation is introduced by a new …rm. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, ch.7) and Thompson (1996) notice that it is hard to reconcile this property with the
observed pattern with persistent dominance of established …rms, at least on an annual time
scale4. We have therefore developed an alternative model where incumbent …rms persistently
innovate and grow or decline over a number of years. The relationship between our model and
the previous literature on the quality ladder model is discussed in appendix A, where we also
list a number of other studies related to our analysis5.
Compared to the early work by Simon and others on …rm growth and Gibrat’s law6, our
framework gives some value added in that the random walk process for the …rms’ demand is
not imposed on the model as an a priori assumption, but emerges as an endogenous result from
quality changes resulting from R&D activities which are treated in the model as forward looking
investment behavior.
The next section spells out the model and discusses the validity of the assumptions of the
model in view of existing empirical studies. Additional empirical implications of the model are
derived and examined in section 3. Section 4 elaborates on the speci…cation of the demand side
of our model, the nature of competition across …rms within the whole industry and the optimal
price setting. Section 5 provides conclusions and discussion of future research.
4See e.g. Gruber (1992). Geroski (1998) surveys a large number of empirical studies of the performance of
large …rms.
5Ericson and Pakes’ (1995) study has a focus similar to ours in that they develop a theoretical model of R&D
investment and …rm growth through innovation consistent with a number of empirical observations. Another
related study is Cohen and Klepper (1996) which provides an interpretation of the empirical patterns of R&D
investments similar to our model, but they do not address the issue of …rm growth. See appendix A for further
remarks.
6See e.g. Ijiri and Simon (1977) and the survey by Sutton (1997).
32 Our version of the quality ladder model
This section presents a theoretical model of R&D investments and …rm growth. As pointed out
above, our analysis is a variation of the quality ladder model, with some new elements inspired
by the patent race literature concerned with the persistence of monopoly. The analysis derives
explicit expressions for the …rm’s R&D investments and the rate of …rm growth. The focus
in this section is on an individual …rm doing R&D to avoid direct competition from potential
entrants, while section 4 shows how the analysis easily can be extended to a simultaneous study
of a many …rms competing within an industry.
2.1 Dynamic optimization and …rm growth
The essential process in the model is the upgrading of the quality of a …rm’s product, where the
quality of the product is increased step-wise through cumulative innovations. For concreteness,
we assume that the …rst …rm to innovate receives a patent lasting at least until the improved
version of the product arrives. Consider …rst the incumbent …rm’s participation in the race for
innovation k+1, given that it holds the patent for the product at stage k. Denote the incumbent’s
hazard rate of innovation by ¸, corresponding to the level of R&D measured in e¢ciency units,
per unit of time. Considering a small length of time, ¢t, we have a Bellman-type equation for
the value function for the incumbent …rm
V (k) = max
¸
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where ¼(k) and w are the pro…t ‡ow from product k and the ‡ow of R&D costs per unit of ¸,
respectively. k0 is the state of the …rm after the ¢t units of time have elapsed.
If the …rm makes an innovation, it can choose between stopping its R&D e¤ort and earn a
pro…t ‡ow ¼(k + 1) until the innovation k + 2 arrives, or carrying on its R&D e¤ort one more
step. If it chooses the latter, the …rm has to pay a sunk cost, F(k+1); for new R&D equipment
needed to participate in stage k + 1 of the innovation race. In the …rst case, with e¡¸(k+1)¿as
the probability that the innovation k +2 has not arrived at time ¿, the …rm’s expected value is
Z 1
0
e¡[r+¸(k+1)]¿¼(k + 1)d¿ =
¼(k + 1)
r + ¸(k + 1)
: (2)
Our model also incorporates the threat of innovation by an outside competitor, which innovates
with a hazard rate ~ ¸. Hence, the …rm can be in four di¤erent situations or states after ¢t:
(i) Nothing happens and the incumbent continuous as before, (ii) the incumbent innovates and
continuous its R&D, (iii) the incumbent innovates and stops its R&D, and (iv) the competitor
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W(k + 1) ´ max
·
¼(k + 1)
r + ¸(k + 1)
;V (k + 1) ¡ F(k + 1)
¸
:
~ V (k + 1) in the last term in (3) is the value of being an outside competitor in stage k + 1 of
the innovation race. Assuming free entry such that the value of the potential entrant is equal
to the R&D sunk costs, i.e. ~ V (k +1) = F(k +1), the last term in (3) is reduced to ¡~ ¸¢tV (k):
Inserting (3) into (1), multiplying both sides with (1 + r¢t), and neglecting terms of second or
higher order in ¢t, it follows that
rV (k) = max
¸
h
¼(k) ¡ w¸ + ¸fW(k + 1) ¡ V (k)g ¡ ~ ¸V (k)
i
: (4)
Similarly, the Bellman equation for the potential entrant in the race for innovation k + 1,
leads to
r~ V (k) = ¡w~ ¸ + ~ ¸
h
W(k + 1) ¡ ~ V (k)
i
¡ ¸~ V (k):
This expression can be rewritten as
~ V (k) =
~ ¸[W(k + 1) ¡ w]
r + ~ ¸ + ¸
(5)
= F(k) = ~ ¸f
where the last line re‡ects the free entry condition. The R&D sunk costs are assumed to increase
linearly with the scale of the innovative activity (cf. lab. costs)7. From (5), and accounting for
~ ¸ not being negative, we have that




[W(k + 1) ¡ w] ¡ r:
This equation shows that as the incumbent’s R&D e¤ort, ¸, increases, the potential entrant’s
R&D e¤ort, ~ ¸; will decrease with the same amount so that the sum is constant.
The incumbent …rm has a …rst mover advantage, and, hence, the incumbent …rm’s optimal
R&D level can be derived by inserting (6) into (4):
rV (k) = max
¸
[¼(k) ¡ ¸fW(k + 1) ¡ V (k) ¡ wg ¡ maxf0;¸¤ ¡ ¸g V (k)]: (7)
7Allowing the R&D sunk costs also to include a …xed (size-independent) component may be more realistic,
but complicates the mathematical analysis considerably.
5The ¸ that maximizes the right hand side of this expression is given by ¸¤(k); assuming that
the condition 0 < W(k +1) ¡ w < V (k) is satis…ed.
In this case ~ ¸ = 0, i.e. the incumbent preempts the innovation race. Notice that since the
probability rate at which the incumbent’s current pro…ts is displaced, is …xed independent of the
incumbent’s own R&D, due to the free entry condition, (5), the so-called Arrow-e¤ect will not
arise here. The Arrow e¤ect is the incumbent’s tendency to hold back its current R&D e¤ort to
avoid loosing its current pro…t; cf. Arrow (1962). Gilbert and Newbery (1984) made the same
observation about the disappearance of the Arrow e¤ect in their argument with Reinganum
(1983), and they emphasized that …rst mover advantage for the incumbent is essential for the
argument.









where the last equality follows from the de…nition of ¸¤(k) in (6). Equation (8) says that the
value of the incumbent …rm is equal to the expected pro…t from holding the current innovation
plus the sunk R&D costs associated with the race for innovation k + 1. It follows that when
making innovation k + 1, the incumbent is indi¤erent between stopping its R&D e¤ort thereby
earning a pro…t ‡ow ¼(k + 1) until the innovation k + 2 arrives, or carrying on its R&D e¤ort
one more step. If, however, the incumbent has slightly lower R&D sunk costs than the potential
entrant (a little epsilon will do), it will choose to continue, and we assume that this is the case.
Then W(k +1) = V (k + 1) ¡F(k +1). Using this and (8) for V (k +1), the de…nition of ¸¤(k)










2.2 Some additional functional form assumptions
Some additional functional form assumptions are required in order to derive predictions consis-
tent with the empirical observations discussed in the introduction, and which we will consider
in more detail in section 3. We start by assuming that the value of holding a patent, the ‡ow
and set up costs of R&D all increase as the product becomes more advanced, such that
¼(k) = ¼0e´¼k; w(k) = w0e´wk; f(k) = f0e´fk:
The …rst assumption is straight forward, while the empirical support for the last two assumptions
will be discussed in section 2.3.
6The incumbent’s R&D e¤ort, given by (9), can now be rewritten as
¸¤(k) =
¼0=f0




e(´w¡´f)k ¡ r: (10)
A stationary state In the general case, the rate of innovation by the incumbent …rm, ¸¤(k)
given by (10), depends on the …rm’s product quality, k. However, if ´¼ = ´w = ´f, the rate of
innovation will be independent of k, i.e. ¸¤ = ¸¤(k) = ¸¤(k + 1), and from (10) it follows, after














There are two o¤setting forces that make ¸¤ independent of k in this case. On the one hand,
innovation is assumed to get harder and harder when k increases, as re‡ected by w0(k) and f0(k)
being positive, while on the other hand, the expected returns to an innovation also increases
with k (cf. ¼0(k) > 0).
Notice that the steady state level of R&D e¤ort, ¸¤, is an increasing function of the (basic)
rate of pro…t, ¼0; and the size of each innovative step as captured by the parameter ´. The
costs per e¢ciency unit of R&D are captured by the two parameters w0 and f0, and if these two
parameters increase, the steady state rate of innovation will decrease. Finally, the steady state
rate of innovation declines with the discount rate.
The knife edge case, ´¼ = ´w = ´f; is analytically very attractive, and it also provides
predictions consistent with a number of empirical observations that we will discuss in section
3. What will, however, happen if this strict relationship doesn’t hold? If ´¼ is less than ´w
or ´f, the innovation rate, ¸¤(k); will decline as k increases since the e¤ect that innovation
becomes more costly as k increases dominates the increasing pro…tability of the innovations as
k increases. This imply that the changes in k will slow down as k increases. The other case,
where ´¼ is larger than ´w and ´f, has the opposite implication, i.e. that the changes in k will
speed up as k increases. Below we assume that …rm size is determined by product quality. The
…rst case will then correspond to smaller …rms growing faster than larger …rms, while the second
case will correspond to larger …rms growing faster than smaller …rms. The …rst case has some
empirical support, but the rest of the paper focuses on the knife edge, steady state case as it
simplify the analysis considerably.
The R&D intensity in steady state As in the quality ladder literature, we assume that a
…rm’s sales (or market share) increase with its product quality, such that
S(k) = S0 e´sk: (12)











where the last equality holds if an additional steady state assumption is imposed, i.e. ´s = ´w.
In this steady state case, the R&D intensity is independent of the …rm’s product quality, k, and,
consequently, …rm size.
The expression (13) covers only the R&D ‡ow costs, which typically accounts for 80-90
percent of R&D expenditures. The point that the R&D intensity is independent of the …rm’s
product quality, k, will, however, hold more generally, since the R&D sunk costs also increase
at the same rate as the …rm’s product quality, k.
2.3 Short and long run diminishing returns in R&D
The model introduces diminishing returns in R&D in two di¤erent ways; one concerning the re-
lationship between the …rm’s level of R&D and the expected waiting time to the next innovation,
and the other relates to the increasing costs of doing R&D as the product becomes increasingly
advanced.
The assumption that the R&D costs, w(k)¸(k); increase linearly with level of R&D activity,
¸(k), is analytically very convenient as it permits an explicit solution for ¸¤. It implicitly imposes
diminishing returns in innovation, as the expected waiting time to the next innovation, given
by 1=¸, is reduced at a declining rate with level of R&D activity. Declining returns to scale in
R&D is also introduced through the assumption that costs per e¢ciency unit of R&D increase
when the products become more and more advanced.
The issue of “returns to scale in R&D” has been the subject of much research on the basis
of patent statistics; see Griliches (1990) for a survey. In a study of the relationship between
patents and R&D in a panel of U.S. …rms, Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1986) report estimates
of the elasticity between 0.3 and 0.6 in the longitudinal dimension, suggesting rather sharply
diminishing returns. However, Blundell, Gri¢th and Windmeijer (1999) have recently revisited
this issue and they …nd a higher long run elasticity (0.6-0.9) based on their new, preferred
speci…cation of the dynamic process. Finally, Griliches (1990) argues that the appearance of
diminishing returns in the longitudinal dimension could be an artifact due to the incompleteness
of the underlying data rather than a re‡ection of the characteristics of the underlying innovation
process.
8Other studies have found some support for diminishing returns to R&D using cross-sectional
data and macro data. Bound et al. (1984) report that the number of patents per dollar of
R&D is signi…cantly lower for …rms with larger R&D budgets8. Similarly, Acs and Audretsch
(1991) …nd a negative relationship between innovations per R&D dollar and the level of R&D
investments9. Using time series data at the macro level, several researchers point out a similar
pattern, i.e. the increasing ratio of R&D per patent; see Caballero and Ja¤e (1993), Kortum
(1993) and Griliches (1994). One interpretation of these …ndings is that they re‡ect diminishing
returns to R&D. Cohen and Klepper (1996) discuss at greater length the diminishing returns to
R&D issue and the relevant empirical literature.
Finally, we should keep in mind that even if the estimated elasticity of patents with respect
to R&D expenditures had been precisely estimated in the patent studies, it is not clear how
that should be translated to the form of the innovation function in our model. That is, what
is the relationship between a patent and making a step on the quality ladder; does a patent
increase demand with a certain percentage, or is the percentage increase in demand from a
patent dependent on the stock of patents and the …rm’s size? This functional form question
remains open10.
3 Main propositions derived from the model and the empirical
evidence
Our model of …rm growth has a number of steady-state predictions that …ts well with the em-
pirical patterns of …rm growth and R&D investments, as we will show in this section. In our
discussion, we draw on the empirical …ndings from several studies, in addition to our new empir-
ical results derived from a sample of Norwegian R&D-performing …rms in high-tech industries,
1985-95. An attractive aspect of the Norwegian data set is that variables are reported at the
line-of-business level within each …rm. This …ts our framework better than the more widely
used sets of data where the …rm is the unit of observation, since many …rms are conglomerates
producing a large number of di¤erent products. Appendix B provides details on sample and
variable construction.
8Griliches (1990) discusses alternative interpretations of this …nding by Bound et al., and he argues that the
pattern might be an artifact due to a sample selectivity problem for small …rms.
9Acs and Audretsch’s (1991) result is based on a cross sectional analysis of a comprehensive data set on
innovations collected by the Small Business Administration.
10The relationship between sales and patents might be so noisy that it is hard to discriminate between alternative
functional forms on the basis of the available data. The standard assumption in the literature is a log-log
relationship between patent counts and sales, rather than a linear-log relationship; see e.g. Griliches, Hall and
Pakes (1991).
93.1 Patterns across …rms within the same industry
3.1.1 R&D intensity is independent of …rm size
The R&D intensity in steady-state is given in (13), and since the right hand side of (13) does
not vary with k, we have established that
Proposition 1 R&D increases proportionally with …rm size so that R&D intensity is indepen-
dent of size.
The empirical literature that relates to this issues is vast as is clear, c.f. the survey in Cohen and
Klepper (1996)11. A simple illustration of the relationship between R&D and …rm size can be
derived from our sample of Norwegian R&D-performing line-of-businesses. Regressing the log
of R&D expenditures, lnRit; against log of sales, lnSit; where i and t refer to line-of-business
and year, respectively, we obtained the relationship
lnRit = 0:89 ¢ lnSit + dummies +error term,
(0:07)
where the number in parenthesis is (heteroskedastic adjusted) standard error12. The R-square
is 0.49, and the relationship include year and industry dummies. Even though the elasticity of
R&D with respect to size is less than one, the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. Figure 1
graphs the relationship between log R&D and log sales together with a smoothed average and
a straight line corresponding to an elasticity equal to one. The graph shows that R&D is close
to proportional to …rm size, in particular above a minimum threshold.
A more elaborate study is provided by Bound et al. (1984), based on the Compustat …le
covering …rms in US manufacturing, and they conclude, after checking a number of econometric
issues, that R&D increases proportionally to size. They …nd deviations from this pattern among
very large and very small …rms, which tend to be more R&D intensive than the rest. However,
as they point out, very small …rms on the Compustat …les are likely to be more innovative
and do more R&D than the average small …rm in US manufacturing13. Cohen, Levin and
Mowery (1987) con…rm the main conclusion in Bound et al. at the …rm level, and also at the
line of business level for the sample of R&D performing business units. They report, however,
some positive relationship between the R&D intensity and the size of the business unit for the
sample of all business units. In their survey, Cohen and Levin (1989) emphasize that the size
11See also the surveys by Cohen and Levin (1989) and Cohen (1995).
12Estimates where lnSit was instrumented with lagged values or the number of employees gave very similar
results.
13Griliches (1990) elaborates on this argument.
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Figure 1: The relationship between log R&D and log sales toghether with a line re‡ecting the
smoothed average (cf. crossed line) and a line corresponding to an elasticity equal to one (cf.
continuous line).
11e¤ects in the R&D intensities, even in cases where they are found to be statistically signi…cant,
are “minute both in terms of the variance explained and the magnitude of the coe¢cients”.
Similarly, Stylized fact 3 in Cohen and Klepper (1996) states that “in most industries it has not
been possible to reject the null hypothesis that R&D varies proportionally with size across the
entire …rm size distribution”. We conclude that Proposition 1, and hence the model presented
in this paper, is a reasonable …rst approximation to at least one widely studied pattern of R&D
investments.
3.1.2 Firm growth is independent of …rm size
In (11), we showed that ¸ is independent of k in steady state. Since k determines the size of the
…rm according to (12) and ¸ is the Poisson parameter in the stochastic process for k, we have
established the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The model implies …rm growth independent of …rm size, in accordance with
Gibrat’s law.
There is a long line of research on the empirical relationship between …rm size and …rm growth,
see the survey by Sutton (1997). In our Norwegian sample, we found that log of …rm size is very
close to a random walk, i.e.
lnSit = 0:97 ¢ lnSi;t¡2 + error term
(0:013)
essentially consistent with no relationship between …rm growth and …rm size. The R-square
for this relationship is 0.92. Similarly, regressing ln(Sit=Si;t¡2) on [ln(Sit) + ln(Si;t¡2)]=2 gave a
statistically insigni…cant estimate equal to 0.01 and an R-square less than one percent.
Two more elaborate studies for US manufacturing are Evans (1987) and Hall (1987). Evans
(1987) concludes that departures from Gibrat’s law might be signi…cant for small …rms and long
time periods, but one “might not go too wrong by maintaining Gibrat’s law” for “short run
changes in the growth and size distribution of the largest …rms”. Hall (1987) has carried out
a careful analysis considering sampling bias and measurement errors, and she concludes that
“Gibrat’s law is weakly rejected for the smaller …rms ... and accepted for the larger …rms”. The
evidence suggests that Gibrat’s law is not universally true, and it would not make sense to take
that pattern for granted, but we consider it desirable that our model can be made consistent
with this benchmark case.
123.1.3 R&D follows a random walk
From equation (13), showing that the R&D intensity is independent of product quality, and
Proposition 2 we have that:
Proposition 3 R&D follows a random walk (Gibrat’s law in R&D).
Our sample showed that log of R&D investments is not quite a random walk, but quite close:
lnRit = 0:89 ¢ lnRi;t¡2 + error term
(0:027)
with an R-square equal to 0.81. Figure 2 con…rms that R&D is close to a random walk, and
almost exactly so when R&D is above a minimum threshold. Notice that measurement errors
in lnRi;t¡2 is likely to bias the estimated coe¢cient downwards. An alternative approach, less
a¤ected by random measurement errors, is to regress ln(Rit=Ri;t¡2) on [ln(Rit) + ln(Ri;t¡2)]=2,
and this gave an insigni…cant parameter estimate equal to -0.02 and an R-square less than one
percent.
In a study of US manufacturing …rms (covering 8 years), Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1986)
conclude that “R&D investment [is] essentially a random walk with an error variance which is
small relative to the total variance of R&D expenditures between …rms”.
3.1.4 The size distribution of …rms is skewed
It is well known that a process of …rm growth according to Gibrat’s law, will generate a skewed
size distribution of …rm size:
Proposition 4 The model will generate a highly skewed distribution of …rm size.
Using observations of log of sales for the business units in our Norwegian sample we have
performed a skewness test for log-normality separately for each of the years 1985 and 1995.
The results show that log-normality can be rejected at the 0.5 and 0.2 percent signi…cant levels,
respectively, for the two years. Examining the distribution of log-sales in a standardized normal
probability plot, it is clear that the distributions of …rm sizes have thicker upper tails than the
log-normal14. To our knowledge, there has been little systematic analysis of the skewness of the
…rm size distribution in high-tech industries (or other industries for that matter) since the book
by Ijiri and Simon (1977). See, however, the discussions in the surveys by Geroski (1998) and
Sutton (1997).
14In the working paper version of this paper we documented similar skewness in the size distribution within
separate 4-digit (ISIC) industries.
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Figure 2: The relationship between log R&D in year t (vertical axis) and t ¡ 2 together with
smoothed average (cf. crossed line) and a line corresponding to an elasticity equal to one (cf.
continuous line).
143.1.5 The variance of the …rm size distribution increases over time
Since the intensity parameter (¸) for the arrival of new innovations is independent of the level
of k, the process will generate a Poisson distribution for k with a parameter which increases in
proportion with the “age” of the process15. We consider the …rms (within an industry) to be
di¤erent realizations of such processes, and hence:
Proposition 5 The model will generate a more and more widely spread distribution of …rm
sizes as the average …rm age increases.
The increasing spread generated by Gibrat’s law has been the focus of much research and
it has largely been considered an unrealistic implication; see Steindl (1968) for a survey of the
early attempts to create models for the …rm size distribution, based on random walk growth but
with a stable (non-increasing) spread of the distribution, and McCloughan (1995) for a recent
study and further references. Entry and exit of …rms can be one stabilizing force, as was early
demonstrated by Simon and his coworkers; see Ijiri and Simon (1977).
However, the increasing spread of the …rm size distribution, as suggested by Proposition
5, may not be unrealistic in many cases. The growth of IBM in the mainframe industry and
Microsoft in the software industry are two, well-known examples of increasing dominance by the
leading …rms as industries mature. Klepper (1996) cites several empirical studies emphasizing
the pattern of increasing concentration and dominance by leading …rms over the industry life
cycle. Finally, notice that our model predicts an increasing spread of the …rm size distribution
only if the average …rm age increases. The issue of average …rm age is, of course, largely
determined by the pattern of entry and exit, which is left open in the model presented above16.
3.2 Di¤erences in R&D and innovation across industries
The propositions above referred to regularities between …rms within the same industry, presum-
ably facing similar innovative opportunities, pro…tability of R&D and degree of competition.
However, the innovative opportunities, pro…tability of R&D and degree of competition clearly
di¤er across industries and the model in section 2 has implications for how such di¤erences
between industries will a¤ect R&D expenditures and the rate of innovation.
15The parameter in the Poisson distribution is proportional to (¸t) in the case with a stationary intensity
parameter (¸), where t is the age of the process. More generally, with a non-stationary intensity parameter, we
have that the spread (and the mean) in the Poisson distribution is
R t
0 ¸(s)ds:
16Pakes (1994) considers structural analysis of …rm growth incorporating entry and exit decisions.
153.2.1 Competition, R&D and innovation
There is an old and still ongoing debate about the impact of competition on R&D expenditures
and the rate of innovation, and our model captures two aspects of this debate17. The …rst relates
to competition in the race to innovate. Our analysis in section 2.1 of the incumbent’s tendency
to preempt the race, shows that it is the threat of entry by an outsider that pushes forward
the innovative e¤ort by the incumbent, and the incumbent’s innovative e¤ort would have been
reduced in the absence of such a threat. Hence, competition in the innovative race stimulates
innovation, as has also been emphasized in the patent race literature. The second aspect of
competition relates to competition in the product market once the innovation has taken place.
This is re‡ected in the ‡ow of pro…t to the innovative …rm. A higher ‡ow of pro…t will give
higher R&D expenditures and more innovation, as can be seen from (11). That high pro…ts
from innovation stimulates the innovative e¤ort is not a new observation; it was recognized
already when the patent law was introduced in the …fteenth century and forcefully pointed out
by Schumpeter (1942). To summarize:
Proposition 6 Competition in the race to innovate (ex ante) stimulates innovation and R&D
expenditures, while competition in the product market (ex post) reduces the innovative e¤ort, due
to reduced pro…tability of innovations.
The literature on R&D and competition has also stressed a third issue, – the role of the costs
of internal versus external …nance in R&D investments, emphasizing that external funds impose
higher costs of …nance, especially for R&D investments due to problems of asymmetric infor-
mation. This line of argument, …rst attributed to Schumpeter (1942), suggests that high pro…ts
stimulate R&D spending and innovation, as the pro…ts provide scope for internal …nance18. A
higher discount rate reduces the rate of innovation in our model as shown in (11).
It is empirically hard to unravel the relationship between competition and innovative e¤ort,
as the various aspects of competition often are closely linked and pull in opposite directions,
as stated in Proposition 6. In their survey of the relationship between innovation and market
structure, Cohen and Levin (1989) conclude that “the empirical results bearing on the Schum-
peterian hypotheses [about innovation, …rm size and market concentration] are inconclusive, in
large part because investigators have failed to take systematic account of more fundamental
sources of variation ... [across] …rms and industries”.
17See Nickell (1996) for a wider discussion and further references.
18However, Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999) have argued that when managers goal is survival rather than
pro…t maximization, large funds of internal …nance may reduce the incentives to innovate.
16The problem of interpretation is illustrated by some recent, empirical studies of the rela-
tionship between pro…t margins (i.e. cash ‡ow relative to sales), innovation and R&D-intensity
across …rms, including the studies by Geroski, Machin and van Reenen (1993), Brouwer and
Kleinknecht (1994) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994). Brouwer and Kleinknecht’s study is
a pure cross sectional analysis of the relationship between R&D and the pro…t margin, while the
studies by Geroski et al. and Himmelberg and Petersen use longitudinal data sets. Brouwer and
Kleinknecht …nd a positive relationship between R&D intensity and the pro…t margin in their
cross section, which can re‡ect both the positive e¤ect of internal funding and the (ex post)
product market competition e¤ect. Similarly, several other studies, including Himmelberg and
Petersen (1994), report a positive relationship between R&D intensity and the cash ‡ow relative
to sales, i.e. the pro…t margin, which also can re‡ect either of the two positive e¤ects.
Geroski et al. (1993) identify a positive relationship between innovation counts and the
pro…t margin, and they emphasize a longitudinal pattern suggesting a causal relationship that
runs from changes in innovative activity to changes in the pro…t margin. They also point out,
however, that the longitudinal e¤ects are small compared to persistent cross sectional di¤erences
in the pro…t margins. In the model presented above, the causal relationship runs the other way,
i.e. from expected pro…ts per unit of output to R&D investments, because product markets
with higher expected pro…ts will cet.par. attract more R&D investments. In section 4, we will
show how our model can be extended to accommodate a causal pattern where a new innovation
increases the pro…t margin, which then gradually decreases as the innovation gets older. This
extension allows also for a causal relationship running both ways, between R&D and innovation
on the one hand, and higher pro…t margins on the other.
3.2.2 Innovative opportunities stimulate innovation
In discussing (11), we noticed that the rate of innovation is higher when the innovative oppor-
tunities are larger, i.e. with larger innovative steps (cf. ´) or when the costs per e¢ciency unit
of R&D are lower (cf. w0 and f0). Furthermore, we can show that the R&D intensity also will
be higher with larger innovative steps and lower costs per e¢ciency unit of R&D. Proving the
second part of this last claim is not entirely straightforward, but it can be done easily when the
ratio, µ, between f0 and w0 is low. This is quite realistic as investment costs in R&D (labora-
tories and equipment) typically amount to less than 10-20 percent of total R&D. In this case,
















which, inserted in (13), implies that the R&D intensity, w0¸¤=S0; declines when the costs per
e¢ciency unit of innovation;w0, increase. Hence, we have established that our model is consistent
with the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Industries with higher innovative opportunities will have higher rate of innova-
tion and higher R&D intensity.
This proposition is intuitive and there is a large body of research suggesting that higher
innovative opportunities spur innovative activities and R&D investments; see e.g. Pakes and
Schankerman (1984) and the surveys by Cohen and Levin (1989) and Cohen (1995, section 4).
3.2.3 Firm growth rates are more dispersed in innovative industries
The variance of …rm growth rates is proportional to ´2¸¤, if we neglect …rm entry and exit.
Hence, ignoring the issue of …rm entry and exit for argument’s sake, we have that
Proposition 8 The variance of …rm growth rates is higher in industries with a higher rate of
innovation.
This proposition is consistent with Klette and Førre’s (1998) …nding that more R&D intensive
industries have higher rates of job reallocation.
4 Product market competition
In the analysis of …rm behavior in section 2, we did not consider other …rms producing similar
products in the same industry, but this section shows how the analysis easily can be extended to
a simultaneous study of many, heterogenous …rms competing within an industry with vertically
and horizontally di¤erentiated products. That is, the model of …rm behavior presented in section
2 can be embedded in a model of product market competition based on discrete choice theory for
the demand of di¤erentiated products. This model of market competition allows for simultaneous
growth and decline of di¤erent …rms in the same industry. Indeed, a breakthrough in one …rm,
leading to growth in demand, will reduce the demand and market shares for the products of its
competitors.
18Consider a …rm producing a product i of quality ki and with price Pi. The …rm’s sales are





with v(ki;Pi) = ´ski ¡ ®lnPi. The parameter ´s was introduced in (12), ® re‡ects the price
elasticity of demand and M is the size of the market, while J refers to all …rms in the market.
This demand system has been extensively discussed by others; see e.g. Anderson, dePalma and
Thisse (1992), Berry (1994) and their references. Ignoring the price e¤ects for the moment, …rm
growth or decline is driven by cumulative improvements in product quality of the …rm’s own
product (ki) relative to improvements in the quality of competing products. Notice that it is
a …rm’s relative product quality as well as its relative price that determines its market share.
This property suggests that a …rm has to upgrade the quality of its product at the pace of its
competitors in order to preserve its market share.
The model presented in section 2 focuses on the quality, ki, of a single …rm and how the
changes in ki is generated by the …rm’s R&D investments. Formally, the speci…cation in (12)





The analysis in section 2 assumes that the …rm considers the development of S0 to be independent
of changes in its product quality. Section 5 will elaborate on the relationship between product
quality and price setting, cf. the numerator (15). Concerning the denominator in (15), we
assume that the …rms are small and consider its development as exogenously given, independent
of e.g. their own R&D decisions, in the spirit of monopolistic competition. In contrast, notice
that the models in Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) emphasize the
strategic interactions in R&D investment decisions across producers within the industry. R&D
investments are also driven by strategic considerations in our model, but each …rm con…nes its
strategic considerations to deterring outside entry into its product line.
5 Optimal price setting and product quality
So far, we have ignored the important issue of price setting and, in particular, the relationship
between optimal price setting and product quality. Our analysis of steady state assumes that
the ‡ow of pro…ts, ¼(k); and sales, S(k), increase at the same rate as k increases, implying that
the price is independent of product quality, k. This section discusses the theoretical justi…cation
19and empirical support for this price setting assumption. In the pricing stage, a …rm is facing
price competition from two di¤erent margins: (i) Competition from other di¤erentiated products
as captured by the denominator in (14), and (ii) competition from the lower quality versions
of the same di¤erentiated product. When the price setting of a new product is constrained by
competition from the lower quality versions of the same di¤erentiated product, the innovation is
labelled as a non-drastic innovation, following Arrow’s (1962) terminology, and the innovation
is termed drastic if this is not the case.
5.1 Non-drastic innovations
Let us denote the constant, marginal production costs for …rm i by ci, which are independent
of ki. Below we discuss cases where the production costs vary with product quality. The lower
quality variety of product i (denoted ki¡1) can be produced by competing …rms, and we assume
for simplicity that they have the same marginal costs as …rm i. If the monopoly price for …rm i
exceeds ci e´s=®, the new (high-quality) product will be outcompeted by the old variety19. This
is the case of a non-drastic innovation. In this case, as shown by Arrow (1962), the optimal price
is the so-called “limit price”, determined such that the lower quality product is just competed
out of the market, i.e.
Pi = ci e´s=®
minus a little “epsilon”. Notice that this limit price prevents the lower quality variety of the
product to enter, and it is consequently only the highest quality variety of each product which
is present in the market. Clearly, this price is determined independently of ki, and the basic
‡ow of pro…t is

















which is higher for low-cost …rms, since ® > 1 (i.e. elastic demand). Consequently, from (11),
the rate of innovation is higher for low-cost …rms.
5.2 Drastic innovations
In the case of drastic innovations, a …rm with a new innovation can charge the monopoly price
as it is not constrained in its price setting by the presence of lower quality varieties of the same
19This follows from the demand system (cf. eq. 14), as consumers will choose the low quality variety at price
ci if v(ki;Pi) < v(ki ¡ 1;ci):
20product, i.e. its monopoly price is below the limit price, ci e´s=®. The optimal price in the case













where si is the …rm’s market share20, and the last approximation is valid when the …rm has
a small market share, i.e. the monopolistic competition case. A …rm’s market share clearly
depends on its product quality, and, hence, with drastic innovation it is only under monopolistic
competition that the price is independent of product quality. Notice that this assumption of
small market shares is consistent with our previous assumption that the …rm considers the











which is higher for low-cost …rms, as in the non-drastic case.
5.3 Some empirical evidence
The pro…t margin in our analysis above, is argued to be independent of product quality, and since
product quality determines market shares, there should be no relationship between pro…t margins
and market shares. This seems to be consistent with the survey of the empirical evidence on the
relationship between pro…t margins and market shares by Schmalensee (1989), who conclude
that “pro…tability is not generally strongly related to market shares” within industries, with
a few exceptions. Similarly, Griliches and Cockburn (1994) show that increased competition
and drastic changes in market shares due to entry of new generic drugs in the pharmaceutical
industry they consider, did not seriously a¤ect the price charged by the incumbent …rm. Metrick
and Zeckhauser (1996) also provide empirical evidence suggesting that the pro…t margins are
independent of product quality in the markets for mutual funds and in the automobile industry.
Our sample of Norwegian …rms, however, did reveal a statistically signi…cant, positive rela-
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20Notice that M =
P
j2J Sj, i.e. total industry sales as can be found by summing both sides of (14) over all
…rms.
21The pro…t margin is constructed as operating surplus divided by sales. See Appendix B for further details.
21and the positive relationship remained statistically signi…cant also when we instrumented lnSit
by other measures of size, such as employment.
5.4 Flows of pro…t over the product life cycle
While the quality of an existing product variety may not a¤ect a …rm’s pro…t margin, the
introduction of a new, innovative product variety seems to a¤ect the pro…t margin. That is
to say, empirical studies, e.g. Mans…eld, Schwartz and Wagner (1981), suggest that the pro…t
margin is high for a new high-quality product variety, but that imitation eliminates innovative
rents within a few years. Similarly, Geroski, Machin and van Reenen (1994) …nd that innovations
increase the pro…t margin for the innovating …rms, while Berndt, Griliches and Rosett (1993)
show that the rate of price change for a product is negatively related to the age of the product22.
The pattern that the pro…t margin declines gradually after a new product variety is intro-
duced can be incorporated in our model. In the case of non-drastic innovations, the marginal
costs may gradually decline for potential producers of the lower quality variety, e.g. as the
knowledge of how to produce the lower quality variety di¤uses to low cost producers. Similarly,
for a product that initially was a drastic innovation, the pro…t margin may turn out to be re-
duced as the competition from the lower quality variety intensi…es when the production costs
for this old, lower quality variety have been su¢ciently reduced.
Formally, this idea corresponds to the pro…ts per unit of time declining with the age of the
innovation according to ¼(k) e¡½t, where t is the time elapsed since the product of quality k
was introduced and ½ is the rate of cost reduction for the lower quality producer. The expected





r + ¸(k) + ½
;
and (8) should in this case be rewritten as
V (k) =
¼(k)
r + ¸(k) + ½
+ F(k):
Extending the model in this way does not require any substantial change in the analysis
in section 2, and it allows for a causal relationship running from R&D to innovation to pro…t
margins, with the ratio between price and marginal costs declining with the age of the most
recent product variety. However, pro…ts per unit of output remain independent of the level of
the product quality also in this extended model, which is essential in order to preserve the simple
mathematical structure of the model spelled out in section 2.
22See also Kuznets (1930).
225.5 R&D as a non-rival input and product quality
So far we have assumed that production costs are independent of the product quality. That
is, our model assumes that once a new product improvement is developed and introduced, no
additional resources are needed to produce this improved product as compared to the older
version. Romer (1990) has emphasized this aspect of R&D, by labeling R&D, or, more precisely,
knowledge as a non-rival input in production. Improvements in computer software packages can
serve as examples of non-rival improvements in product quality.
Our framework hides a second dimension of quality, which can be altered by spending more
resources per unit of production. This quality aspect is a rival output dimension; it is related to
the notion of a rival good in Romer’s (1990) terminology. More horsepower and leather seats in
cars are examples of quality di¤erences in “rival” dimensions. The rival dimension of quality has
implicitly been buried in the measurement of output quantities and prices, and in the marginal
costs. It is not surprising that the costs related to the rival part of quality increase with sales,
and this is why the rival dimension of quality has largely been ignored in our analysis.
The more interesting aspect of quality improvements from the view of …rm growth and
performance, is the non-rival dimension related to product development and research. It is
changes in the non-rival dimension that introduces a cumulative growth process in our model of
…rm performance.
6 Conclusions and remaining issues
We have presented a fully speci…ed, theoretical model of endogenous …rm growth, where R&D
and innovations are the engines of growth. The model is tightly speci…ed and the many speci…c
assumptions were introduced in order to rationalize a number of empirical regularities that have
been established from empirical research on …rm growth and innovation. We have also examined
the empirical content of the assumptions and argued that they are good or, at least, acceptable
approximations to the …ndings in much available empirical research.
On the basis of our analysis, we have argued that our model is promising as a benchmark
model to understand:
1. Why the size distribution of …rms is highly skewed, with persistent heterogeneity.
2. How Gibrat’s law can be reconciled with optimizing behavior.
3. Why R&D intensities across …rms are largely independent of size, even in cases where
R&D is a non-rival input.
23Our model is able to address these three issues within a single, integrated framework.
We must admit that the correspondence between the empirical literature and the empirical
content of our model is not perfect. For instance, our model ignores important aspects of
imitation23. Empirically, it is widely observed that even in high tech industries there is a large
fraction of …rms reporting no R&D activity, and these …rms presumably survive by imitation24.
While our model accounts for much heterogeneity within industries, it still neglects con-
siderable heterogeneity that is widely observed in empirical studies. For instance, we observe
empirically large and persistent di¤erences in R&D intensities between …rms in most industries
also at a disaggregated industry level. The sources of di¤erences in R&D intensities have been
the subject of much empirical research25. Our model can be extended to accommodate such
di¤erences, by introducing di¤erences in productions costs, product market competition and
innovative opportunities across …rms and over time. Identifying and modeling these di¤erent
sources of heterogeneity is a crucial step towards structural estimation of the parameters in the
model. The stochastic structure of such an extended model is probably quite complex and may
be econometrically tractable only through simulations. However, our model provides explicit
mathematical expressions for the key variables, at least in the steady state case, which suggests
that simulation of the model is quite tractable. A natural next step is to explore inference and
testing of the model through simulations.
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27Appendix A: Previous literature
The speci…cation of our model is inspired by the macro-models of endogenous growth developed
by Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995, ch.7). The quality ladder models introduced by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) have the property that each innovation is introduced
by a new …rm, while the producers of the old product varieties are driven out of the market. It
is di¢cult to reconcile this property with the persistence of large …rms that we tend to see in
empirical data, at least at an annual frequency; see surveys of the empirical literature by Sutton
(1997) and Geroski (1998). Thompson (1996) makes the same criticism of the quality ladder
growth model. He develops a complete model of R&D investment and …rm growth, somewhat
di¤erent from the model we present. On the basis of his model, he presents an empirical analysis
of the relationship between R&D and the stock market value of the …rm.
The model presented in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch.7), emphasizing the persistent
dominance of the established …rms rather than the continuous replacement of the leading …rm,
is similar to our model. There is, however, a serious error in the model by Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995, ch. 7.4), and this is why we have developed a new model. Speci…cally, the
second order condition associated with the …rst order condition in their equation (7.39) is not
satis…ed. That is to say, the level of R&D investment that Barro and Sala-i-Martin identify for
the incumbent is not the optimal level of R&D investment.
Our (partial equilibrium) version of the quality ladder model is closely related to patent race
models discussing the persistence of monopoly; see in particular Gilbert and Newbery (1982,
1984). Reinganum’s (1985) model of industry evolution is also related to our analysis. Her model
has the same property as the quality ladder models referred to above, where each innovation is
introduced by a new …rm. The model presented below extends the analysis by Reinganum and
Gilbert-Newbery by allowing for competition between horizontally di¤erentiated products. In
our model each competing product (variety) is upgraded separately, i.e. each competing product
is moving up its own quality ladder.
Our analysis has a focus similar to the work by Ericson and Pakes (1995), Pakes and Ericson
(1998) and Pakes and McGuire (1994). They also present a fully speci…ed model of …rm growth
with investment in innovative activities as the determinant of …rm growth. Their model is more
sophisticated than ours in that it allows for strategic interactions and considerations between
the …rms in their R&D investments decisions. They also have a more complete analysis with
respect to …rm entry and exit. However, the cost of this sophistication is that the Ericson-Pakes
model is analytically di¢cult to handle, and the model must be examined through simulations,
while our simpler model is analytically more tractable. The two models are to some extent
complementary in the sense that our model can most easily be justi…ed in situations where
the …rms considered are small relative to the market, while the case with many …rms creates
problems for the simulations of the Ericson-Pakes model (see Pakes and McGuire, 1994).
There are also some earlier studies of …rm heterogeneity that are related to our study, such as
Jovanovic (1982) and Lippman and Rummelt (1982). Jovanovic’s analysis is a dynamic version
of Lucas’ (1978) model, which is similar to the model by Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979). Both
Lucas and Kihlstrom-La¤ont present theoretical models that are consistent with heterogeneous
…rms, but they are both static and the sources of the heterogeneity are given exogenously, as
is also the case for Jovanovic’s model. The relationship between Jovanovic’s model and the
Ericson-Pakes model is extensively discussed in Pakes and Ericson (1998), and their discussion
is equally relevant for the relationship between Jovanovic’s model and the model we present.
Cohen and Klepper (1996) present a model that can rationalize a number of empirical reg-
ularities regarding R&D investments and …rm size. Our model is in several respects similar to
their analysis of the relationship between R&D and size, but it is somewhat more complete as it
rationalizes why each …rm’s pro…ts from its next innovation are constrained by its current size.
28More generally, our framework explicitly models …rm growth, while …rm growth is treated rather
brie‡y in Cohen and Klepper’s model. Klepper (1996) also examines a related model of …rm
growth and industry evolution driven by innovation. Klepper’s model is able to rationalize a
number of interesting empirical regularities of …rm growth and industry evolution, but the model
is highly stylized at the individual …rm level and therefore di¢cult to reconcile with empirical
studies based on …rms as the unit of observation.
Dasgupta (1986) is to some extent also related to our paper, in that he presents a theoretical
model consistent with a number of the empirical observations we also consider (and some others).
However, Dasgupta’s analysis is based on a static model and does not make any predictions about
patterns of …rm growth and …rm heterogeneity. Indeed, his model assumes identical …rms.
Appendix B: The sample of Norwegian R&D …rms
Our sample of Norwegian R&D …rms covers the high-tech industries ISIC 382, 383 and 385, with
observation for the years 1985, 87, 89, 91, 93 and 95. The sample is constructed by merging data
from the bi-annual R&D-survey with data from the annual manufacturing census, and the unit
of observation is a line-of-business within a …rm at the three digit level. Only line-of-businesses
with at least 20 employees are included as the R&D survey covers a non-representative sample
of smaller …rms. Some observations with very high R&D-intensity have also been eliminated26.
The sample contains 586 observations for 265 line-of-businesses, and only observations with non-
zero R&D investments are included. The same data sources were used in Klette and Johansen
(1998), where further details are provided.
The sales variable is the value of gross production corrected for taxes and subsidies, while
operating surplus is this measure of sales minus materials, energy and labor costs, also corrected
for taxes and subsidies. R&D includes all intramural and extramural R&D expenditures. As
mentioned, all variables are broken down by line-of-business within each …rm.
26The results are based on observations with R&D-intensity below 50 percent, but the results are very similar
if the threshold is increased to 100 percent.
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